The explosion in the 21st century of terrorist activities by Islamic radicals in the United States, Europe and Asia requires reforming the institutions for domestic counterterrorism (CT) and new international relations among individual national CT organizations. This paper discusses the institutional reforms for CT in the United States, focusing particularly on the changes in the FBI. These changes are compared with the way that the British CT activities of the MI5 and MI6 have evolved in response to terrorism in Britain. The paper also discusses the reasons why there is strong cooperation among the CT activities of all the major governments and with the United States in particular, even when those governments do not agree about military cooperation or about the use of economic sanctions.
* Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and President of the National Bureau of Economic Research. This paper was prepared for presentation at a session on "Current and Future Institutions for the World Economy" at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association on January 4, 2008. For more extensive discussions of this subject, see Richard Posner Countering Terrorism (2007) and earlier books by that author. Both types of change are particularly difficult to achieve. Changing the behavior of government organizations is always more difficult than it is in the private sector where change is driven by the combination of the profit motive and the pressure of competition. The inherently covert nature of surveillance and other counterterrorist activities means that international cooperation cannot be organized through traditional international institutions or in public conferences. Nevertheless change in domestic CT activities is occurring and there is evidence of strong international cooperation in dealing with terrorism.
Countering the new terrorism is enormously important to the domestic economy, to international trade, and to all of us as individuals. Potential terrorist acts include small scale attacks on local targets (e.g., bombs in shopping centers) , major attacks like the nine-eleven airplane attacks in New York and Washington and the foiled attempts to blow up several planes flying from London to New York, dirty bombs that combine radioactive material and conventional explosives, cyberterrorism that could shut down communication and transportation networks, bioterrorism that could cause widespread disease, attacks on ports and other key infrastructure, and the explosion of even a small nuclear device that could kill millions of people and destroy a major part of a city.
Although some terrorism can be state sponsored, the more difficult problem facing the United States and other target countries is the terrorism that follows from radical Islam without specific government sponsors. This means that, unlike the conflict with the Soviet Union in the half century after World War II, the new terrorists do not provide an adversary with whom to negotiate or against which to retaliate. The insights of Tom Schelling's Strategy of Conflict do not lend themselves directly to dealing with today's adversaries.
We do not know why radical Islam is spreading as it is or how long it will remain a major source of violence. Alan Krueger has shown us that the terrorists are not driven by their personal poverty. We understand that the leaders of Al Qaida are eager to replace the leadership in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and elsewhere. We know that the high oil prices are contributing to the funds that finance the new terrorism and the spread of its ideological underpinnings. But there is so much about the cause, nature, and financing of the Islamic jihad that we do not know.
Since I cannot begin to deal with all of these issues in the current brief paper, I will focus on the issue of institutional change and international cooperation indicated in the title of this session.
The two aspects of counterterrorism are (1) the gathering and analysis of intelligence about the activities of would be terrorists and (2) This British experience provides a useful comparison to the experience of the United
States where intelligence activities are divided between the FBI and the CIA. Until the 9/11 attacks there was relatively little official concern about the possibility of terrorist acts against the United States. The 9/11 attacks changed that and led to a major increase in CT activity, particularly by the FBI. The need for a new counterterrorism role for the FBI is the major challenge for institutional design in dealing with terrorism in the United States.
Before focusing on the FBI, it is useful to understand the broader scope of the U.S.
intelligence community. Since its founding in 1947, the CIA has had primary responsibility for human intelligence gathering (i.e., by infiltration, the recruitment of others, mail intercepts, etc..) on intelligence targets outside the United States, particularly in the Soviet Union. The CIA also received and analyzed information collected by satellite interception of foreign telephone communication (the "signal intelligence" of the National Security Agency), by the satellite photography of the National Reconnaissance Organization, and by other parts of the intelligence community. All of this was restricted to the activities of foreigners. The CIA is not allowed to collect information on U.S. citizens, green card holders, and other persons in the United States.
The The FBI agents were typically recruited among former law enforcement and military personnel, as well as lawyers and accountants whose skills were helpful in dealing with white collar crimes. All FBI recruits have to pass relatively rigorous physical tests (running, chin ups, etc) that were appropriate to their work as law enforcement officers.
Counterterrorism was a small part of the FBI's work prior to nine-eleven. The law governing FBI activities also limits CT work to actions against individuals who are believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power. Although wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance are readily authorized by ordinary courts for FBI use in criminal investigations, their use in CT investigations requires specific authorization by a special federal court, a process that involves substantial red tape and can involve long delays.
After the attacks of nine-eleven, new legislation and presidential orders made CT a primary responsibility of the FBI. The government substantially increased the FBI's budget for this purpose, created new positions in FBI headquarters to oversee CT activities, and required each local FBI office to create an intelligence gathering and analysis group.
But increased dollars, new leadership positions, and some organizational changes in the local offices did not automatically change the operation of the FBI on the ground. The shift from traditional criminal work to CT requires a major change in the culture of the organization, a shift from arrest and prosecution after a crime has been committed to the gathering of information and analysis designed to prevent terrorist acts before they happen. The FBI Special Agents doing CT work collect intelligence and task "sources" (i.e., ask individuals who are not government employees) to collect intelligence, a very different activity than the overt police work of criminal investigation and prosecution.
This creates a difficult problem for FBI personnel management. FBI Special Agents who do criminal work can be evaluated and promoted on their record of arrests and convictions. In CT work, the primary product is information and analysis rather than arrests and convictions, making it far more difficult to measure the productivity of individual Agents and to compare the performance of Special Agents doing counterterrorism with the performance of those doing criminal work.
For FBI Agents with many years of experience doing criminal work, the shift to CT required a fundamental reorientation of daily activities and of how the agents judged their own performance. For men accustomed to the gun-carrying police work of arrests, the shift to intelligence gathering may seem to be a very tame activity even though its contribution to national security is greater than what they had done in their criminal work.
None of this cultural change was needed in Britain's MI5. The members of the MI5 only had to shift their focus from Irish terrorists to Muslim terrorists. There were no doubt difficult practical issues in infiltrating a new population group, especially one that is ethnically so different from the MI5 staff. But the culture of recruiting sources in the terrorist base community and tasking those sources to collect information was a familiar one. The MI5 also had the tradition of a strong analytic group whose task was to integrate the intelligence collected in the field.
For the FBI, achieving the necessary cultural change requires significant institutional changes. These changes are a work in progress. A visit to the FBI's recruiting web site now shows a new emphasis on counterterrorism careers, with separate career paths for criminal, CT, and cybercrime. Recruiting goes beyond the ethnic and professional groups that previously produced FBI Special Agents. The training program that Special Agents receive gives more attention to problems of terrorism than it did in the past. The principle criticisms raised by Richard Posner and others is that these changes have not gone far enough, leaving the FBI with a bias in favor of criminal work and a staff that prefers criminal work to CT investigations.
The new CT responsibilities of the FBI also required the creation of a group of analysts who can interpret the evidence collected by the special agents and who can use their analytic product to direct additional investigations. At first, the individuals assigned to these positions were previous clerical staff and low level administrators of the FBI. They lacked the training and skills to do this important work. Over time, the FBI has been recruiting a more qualified group of analysts, although critics note that the training of these analysts needs to be substantially strengthened.
Communication and Coordination within the Intelligence Community In addition to changing the culture to give greater value to CT work and strengthening the personnel by new recruiting and training, the FBI (and the intelligence community more generally) had to create institutions to increase communication within the intelligence community. The official 9/11 Commission concluded that the failure of the intelligence community to predict and therefore prevent those attacks despite scattered recognition of suspicious activity pointed to the failure of communication across FBI offices and between the FBI and other parts of the intelligence community. That lack of communication was not a problem when the FBI's activity focused on local crimes but was inappropriate for its new CT mission. It is interesting therefore to ask what it is that drives this close international cooperation in counterterrorism. I believe that three things have been essential to the ability of the U.S. to get such close cooperation from foreign intelligence services. The first of these is the selfinterest of all the cooperating countries. Each country can gain from trading information about potential terrorist threats. This is very different from attempts at cooperation in military activities in Afghanistan or Iraq where national self interest is less obvious to other countries or in discussions about the use of economic sanctions which countries resist because of potential loss of export sales. Second, the United States has superior space-based technology for surveillance of electronic communication by voice and internet and for photographic reconnaissance. Other nations need to cooperate with the United States in order to get the information that only we can obtain in these ways. And, third, the collaboration among intelligence services is generally done without the public visibility that accompanies attempts at military and diplomatic activities through organizations like the United Nations.
Terrorism is unfortunately likely to be one of the major problems facing the United
States and other nations in the years ahead. Continued progress in strengthening counterterrorist organizations within the United States and cooperation in counterterrorism among allies will therefore remain one of our key national priorities.
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